Saint Louis University Public Law Review
Volume 35
Number 2 General Issue (Volume XXXV, No. 2)

Article 9

2016

From War to Peace: When Democracy Prevails?
Izabela Pereira Watts
izabela.watts@cdu.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr

Recommended Citation
Pereira Watts, Izabela (2016) "From War to Peace: When Democracy Prevails?," Saint Louis University
Public Law Review: Vol. 35 : No. 2 , Article 9.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/plr/vol35/iss2/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Saint Louis University Public Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more
information, please contact Susie Lee.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FROM WAR TO PEACE: WHEN DEMOCRACY PREVAILS?
IZABELA PEREIRA WATTS*
ABSTRACT
Why are some war-torn countries able to make the transition to democracy?
This paper intends to bring to light central dilemmas originating from the
efforts of building peace and democracy in fragile states after war. We will
focus on understanding the tensions and contradictions in post-conflict
democratization, the challenges facing interim governments and the role of the
international community. We will first analyze the set of structural and
common dilemmas of peace-building and democratization in the aftermath of
civil war, such as temporal, systemic, horizontal, and vertical dilemmas. The
paper highly contributes theoretically to the body of knowledge by proposing a
spiral of interrelated additional 8 dilemmas: security, safety, moral,
sequencing, design, transparency, financial, and resources. Secondly, the
different dilemmas will be addressed in relation to elections. Thirdly,
constitutionalism is a sine qua non mechanism for establishing the new “social
contract” based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Finally, the
processes of democratization and peace-building are promoted by international
actors who also face their own range of varying and even mutually
contradictory dilemmas. In conclusion, from war to peace, democracy might
prevail initially with a minimalist approach. But only if certain choices of

* Izabela Pereira Watts has been nominated in 2013 “Top 99 Young Professional World Leaders
in Foreign Policy under 33” by the global Affairs Magazine, Diplomatic Courier (USA). With a
large professional experience in democratic governance, political affairs and international
cooperation, she is a PhD researcher on International Relations and Political Science at Charles
Darwin University (Australia). She holds a Master’s degree in International Affairs, Peace
Studies and Conflict Resolution (Argentina) and Master´s degree in Economics and Political
Sciences and undergraduate degree in International Affairs (Brazil). She has worked with several
International Organizations such UN (DPKO-UNMIT), UNDP, UN Women, Organization of
American States, as well as with the private and public sectors as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Brazil with experience in Asia, Latin America, Africa and Europe. Her expertise includes the
fields of international cooperation, elections, humanitarian affairs, public policies, strategic
analysis in the areas of governance, socioeconomic development and gender in conflict zones.
Additionally, she is currently an Ambassador for the Global Peace Index of the Institute of
Economics and Peace (IEP), and also a former Coordinator and Researcher on Armed Conflict
Prevention and Resolution–GapCON and former Columnist for electronic journals of
international analysis with many publications and international awards.
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elections procedures and constitutionalism design with specific separation of
power and power sharing arrangements are foreseen towards sustainable peace.
The paper has a multi-layered perspective that tries to fill the gaps between
theory and practice on fragile states, civil wars, democratic governance and
state institution building. By advancing theory and practice with policyrelevant results, the research hopes to facilitate more effective interventions
and sustainable transitions from war to peace through democratic means.
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I. INTRODUCTION: SOMETHING IS WRONG WITH DEMOCRATIZATION AND
PEACE-BUILDING
On the transition from war to peace: when can democracy be a tool for
sustainable Peace? Why are some war-torn countries able to make the
transition to democracy? In post-conflict situations, how can the international
community assist the birth or consolidation of liberal and democratic states? In
a globalized world, the popular terminology of “fight for democracy” can also
be lethal, violent, and a tool to legitimize the abuse of power. The peace
crusade from war to democracy is an uncertain path. “Peace” and
“Democracy” are two often-desired goals promoted in societies devastated by
war. Constructing democracy and building peace have come to be viewed as
inherently inseparable: “democratic peace building” sums up this compound
agenda and is a key element of international assistance. Curiously, the
historical facts show a paradox. With the “the third wave” of democratization,
the number of democracies in the world more than doubled and democracy
came to be seen as the only legitimate form of government. However, the
number and complexity of armed conflicts or crises has also increased.
Consequently, the number of UN peace operations currently in existence is
unprecedented.1 Furthermore, interventions involving the maintenance of
peace, which is the UN’s main mandate, require multidimensional approaches
to also deal with complex threats as regional spill over, internationalized civil
wars and terrorism. Conversely, the design of complex operations is often
mismatched with existing institutional operational capabilities as well with the
principles of international law.
When the civil war ends, democracy is yet to begin. As the mantra goes, it
is a never-ending process that usually experiences progress and regression.
There are not yet any pillars of an ideal western form of democracy with solid
institutions or mechanisms of constitutionalism, power-sharing, checks and
balances, rule of law, human rights, accountability, public policy formulation
and implementation, free and capable media or independent and nondiscriminatory judiciary nor decentralized political system with multiparty
political landscapes. On the contrary, civil wars leave a legacy of absence of
political culture of tolerance, failed or even collapsed state institutions, weak or
non-existent civil societies, and profound distrust among political actors. It is
peculiarly challenging for countries that have experienced civil war to make
the transition to democracy.
In the aftermath of conflict, the State is on standby: in limbo struggling for
security within a hectic labyrinth of divergent interests and multiple actors.
Establishing democracy in the aftermath of a civil war has proved to be a

1. U.N. Peacekeeping Operations Fact Sheet (Jan. 31, 2016), http://www.un.org/en/peace
keeping/documents/bnote0116.pdf.
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challenging proposition, but not an impossible one. “Democratization should
not be presumed to be a panacea,” says Sebastian von Einsiedel.2 Recently, the
interventions occur more frequently within internal conflict scenarios,
including civil wars (intrastate) or conflicts with regional spill over.3 Some
studies suggest that “more than two-thirds of all armed conflicts in the world
since 1945 have taken the form of civil wars,”4 and that fragile states are
“fifteen times more prone to civil war than developed countries, and they are
the source of most of the world’s refugees.”5 According to United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), at the end of
2015, 125 million people from 37 fragile states have been displaced by
conflict.6 Several political theorists have denied that there is the possibility of
popular government arising immediately out of the chaos of civil war. From
Machiavelli to Huntington, the transition very often leads first to a one-man
rule such as a Prince, Leviathan, or a military dictator before the actual
democratic regime takes place. According to Hartzell and Hoddie, “thirty-five
of the sixty-three countries that experienced civil war from 1945 through the
end of 2006 made the transition to a minimalist, Schumpeterian form of
democracy during the first decade following the end of their respective armed
conflicts.”7 Leonard Wantchekon finds that nearly 40% of all civil wars that
took place from 1945 to 1993 resulted in an improvement in the level of
democracy.8 For example, civil wars gave birth to relatively stable
democracies in Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua among

2. Sebastian von Einsiedel, Policy Responses to State Failure, in MAKING STATES WORK:
STATE FAILURE AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE 13, 27 (Simon Chesterman et al. eds., 2005).
3. LOTHAR BROCK ET AL., FRAGILE STATES: VIOLENCE AND THE FAILURE OF
INTERVENTION 1 (2012); See Michael E. Brown, Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: Causes and
Implications, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT 209, 209–14 (Chester Crocker et al. eds 2001); VIRGINIA P. FORTNA, DOES
PEACEKEEPING WORK: SHAPING BELLIGERENTS’ CHOICES AFTER CIVIL WAR 1 (2008); See
U.N. Development Programme Guidance Note, Governance in Conflict Prevention and Recovery
3 (2009), http://apps.americanbar.org/intlaw/ilrc/Governance%20in%20Conflict%20Prevention%
20&%20Recovery%20Guidance%20Note.pdf.
4. Duk H. Kim, Nurturing Peace: United Nations Peace-building Operations in the
Aftermath of Intrastate Conflicts, 1945-2002 1 (May 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Missouri – St. Louis) (on file with ProQuest Information and Learning Company).
5. SETH D. KAPLAN, FIXING FRAGILE STATES: A NEW PARADIGM FOR DEVELOPMENT 4
(Praeger Sec. Int’l 2008); Stewart Patrick, Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction?, 29
THE WASH. Q., Spring 2006, at 27, 31.
6. See U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Global Humanitarian
Overview 2016 (2016), https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/GHO-2016.pdf.
7. Caroline A. Hartzell & Matthew Hoddie, The Art of the Possible: Power Sharing and
Post-Civil War Democracy, 67 WORLD POL. 37, 37 (Jan. 2015).
8. Leonard Wantchekon, The Paradox of “Warlord” Democracy: A Theoretical
Investigation, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 17, 17 (Feb. 2004).
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others.9 Curiously, civil wars that end in a military victory, in particular those
that end in a rebel victory are associated with higher levels of democracy in the
longer perspective than are wars that end in a cease-fire or peace agreement.10
After the Cold War, and particularly from the 90’s, democratization has
been formally enshrined in the post-war settlement of nearly all intrastate wars.
The use of democratic processes and the creation or transformation of
institutions have been promoted as a transitional recipe to evolve from armed
conflict towards peaceful political competition.11 Towards an “elusive peace,”
a “turbulent democracy” seems to be an inevitable way.12 The inherent risk of
partial democratization is the danger of hostilities amplifying and channeling
back to an endless cycle of conflict, in lieu of converting towards the cycle of
peace.13 Extensive empirical studies suggest that mature democracies are
indeed the most stable and peaceful of all regimes.14 Conversely, the process of
“how to get there” from transitional, unstable, or failed democracies remains
not so much picture-perfect. On a large conceptual gray zone, most war-torn
societies discover themselves sandwiched by war-and-peace or by war-anddemocracy.15 Therefore, as it remains an enigmatic fact, I aim to further
explore why countries so rarely emerge from civil war as robust democracies.
Something is wrong with democratization and peace-building. This paper
intends to bring to light central dilemmas originating from the efforts of
building peace and democracy in fragile states after war. The focus is on the
war-to-peace transitions through democracy and the objective is to anticipate
how to avoid failed states or anocracies that can fuel the cycle of more conflict.
We will concentrate on understanding the tensions and contradictions in postconflict functions, the challenges facing interim governments and the role of
the international community. Needless to say: democratization is not all about
the ballot vote. Nevertheless, elections remain a crucial pillar of democracy
and particularly violent prone after-war. With that aim in mind, we will first
9. Nancy Bermeo, What the Democratization Literature Says—or Doesn’t Say—About
Postwar Democratization, 9 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 159, 160 (2003).
10. Monica Duffy Toft, Peace Through Security: Making Negotiated Settlements Stick, 4
(2003), http://www3.carleton.ca/csds/docs/Toft%20PTS.pdf.
11. See generally Bermeo, supra note 9.
12. TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT,
(Chester A. Crocker et al. eds., 2001); WILLIAM ZARTMAN, ELUSIVE PEACE: NEGOTIATING AN
END TO CIVIL WARS (The Brookings Inst. 1995).
13. See generally Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Peace Index 2014 (2014),
http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/2014-Global-Peace-Index-REPORT_
0-1.pdf.
14. See Håvard Hegre et al., Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political
Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 33, 44 (Mar. 2001).
15. Timothy D. Sisk, Peace-building as Democratization Findings and Recommendations,
in FROM WAR TO DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS OF PEACE-BUILDING 239, 243 (Anna K. Jarstad &
Timonthy D. Sisk eds., 2008).
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analyze the set of structural and common dilemmas of peace-building and
democratization in the aftermath of civil war, as temporal, systemic,
horizontal, and vertical dilemmas. The paper contributes theoretically to the
body of knowledge by advancing the paradoxes faced by democratization and
peace-building with additional 8 dilemmas: security, safety, mortal,
sequencing, design, transparency, financial, and resources. Secondly, the
different dilemmas will be addressed in relation to elections. Thirdly,
constitutionalism is a sine qua non mechanism for establishing the “social
contract” based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Finally, the
processes of democratization and peace-building are promoted by international
actors who also face their own range of varying and even mutually
contradictory dilemmas. Due to size restriction for publication, this paper has
focused on must-have pillars of democratization. A subsequent paper could
analyze the set of post-civil war dilemmas regarding transformation of political
parties, power sharing, transitional justice, human rights, civil society as well
the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of warring
groups.
II. DILEMMAS AND TRADE-OFFS BETWEEN EFFORTS TO PROMOTE PEACE AND
DEMOCRACY

Nowadays, war cessation is predominantly about building anew or about
rebuilding functioning, secure, stable, and democratic (or ‘‘republican’’)
states.16 Beyond fixing fragile states, how does one make a state work after
state failure and governance crisis?17 In this vein, power-sharing comes as an
alternative to partition. The popular formula of democracy building for the
transition from war-to-peace is: elections, new constitution, parliamentary
politics by political parties, creation of independent judicial institutions, and
revival of civil society to plague for reconstruction, reconciliation, and human
rights.
Studies on democratization lead to the impression that democracy itself is
part of the problem and, therefore, that it plays against itself.18 Post-war
societies are too fragile to be exposed to the competitive pressures of the
electoral process. Democratization intrinsically subverts established political
orders, allows new entrants to access the political system, highlights social
cleavages, challenges existing power relations, and threatens incumbent

16. See Michael Barnett, Rebuilding a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States After War, 30
INT’L SEC. 87, 87–88 (Spring 2006).
17. See generally Simon Chesterman, Peace and Security: The Use of Force to Maintain
Law and Order, in YOU, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATION,
AND STATE-BUILDING (Simon Chesterman et al. eds., 2005); See generally KAPLAN, supra note
5.
18. See MARCEL GAUCHET, LA DEMOCRACIA CONTRA SÍ MISMA (Homo Sapiens 2004).
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authority. Consequently, transition to democracy is tumultuous, uncertain, and
often a dangerous business.19 The primary problem is the creation of a
legitimate public order. As well explored by the literature, men may have order
without liberty, but they cannot have liberty without order.20
Anocracies shows that if democracy is half-way, it can be more perilous
than the regime that originally stood prior to intervention.21 In quasidemocracies there is a high level of probability of intra or interstate conflict
that consequently makes fragile states a source of security preoccupation.
Authoritative or democratic systems can be less-war prone. It is the level of
inclusiveness of the political system that results on stability or instability.22
Highly inclusive systems, such as the proportional representation system, are
more stable than low inclusive systems that favor political exclusion, such as
the majoritarian system. Empirically, it seems that democracy per se is not
enough to deter social conflicts.
On the one hand, there is the urgency of war termination. On the other
hand, there is the languid process of democracy building. Therefore, a key
dilemma common to nearly all post-war contexts is the trade-off between short
and longer-term goals of peace-building and democratization. On the delicate
choice between peace and democracy, peace is the ultimate goal of war.
Democracy crowns the success of state building missions. But, an absence of,
or too little democracy may put peace in a challenging position and war might
recur. At this stage, the examination of processes of pre-international
intervention and post-intervention continues to be unsatisfactory. The greatest
paradox between democracy and peace is: in one prism democracy as a
political system is associated with peaceful conflict management, both within
and between states. In another prism, the path to democracy is ironically often
conflict-ridden.23 Peace-building and democratization are dynamic processes.
19. ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL CONFLICT 45 (2004);
Benjamin Reilly, Post-War Elections: Uncertain Turning Points of Transition, in FROM WAR TO
DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS OF PEACE-BUILDING 157, 157 (Anna K. Jarstad & Timonthy D. Sisk
eds., 2008).
20. See HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN NEW WORLD
POLITICS 253–54 (1977); Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, Constitutionalism and Foundational Values:
Philippine Constitutional Authoritarianism Revisited, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS
OF WORLD PEACE: LOGIC AND TINKERING 289, 300 (Richard A. Falk et al. eds., 1993); See
generally DAVID HELD, DEMOCRACY AND THE GLOBAL ORDER: FROM THE MODERN STATE TO
COSMOPOLITAN GOVERNANCE 241–42 (1995); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN
CHANGING SOCIETIES 7–8 (1968).
21. BROCK, supra note 3, at 136.
22. Marta Reynal-Querol, Does Democracy Preempt Civil Wars?, 21 EUR. J. OF POL. ECON.
445, 446 (2005).
23. Anna K. Jarstad & Timothy D. Sisk, Introduction, in FROM WAR TO DEMOCRACY:
DILEMMAS OF PEACE-BUILDING 1, 1 (Anna K. Jarstad & Timonthy D. Sisk eds., 2008); See
generally Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Democratization and the Dangers of War, 20
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The challenges confronting international and local actors when establishing or
re-establishing good governance must also be further elucidated.
When the pen fails, the sword rules. For Mukherjee, introducing
democracy in conflict-ridden societies may decrease the possibility of failure
of peace.24 As per the security dilemma, warring factions need to persuade
each other and the citizens that they are ready to take turns in ruling the
country: that means alternation of power. They also need to persuade citizens
that political lawlessness and violence will be eliminated if they are elected.
Simultaneously law enforcement institutions, such as an effective police force
and a criminal justice system, as well as political institutions, for instance
depoliticized judiciary and electoral commission, must be developed. Without
those institutions, democracy will fail as the promise of security for citizens or
political rights for the warring factions will be only words and no deeds.25
As per definition, a dilemma is a situation in which a choice must be made
between alternatives that are equally undesirable. The literature on
democratization or international intervention that approaches efficacy and
efficiency is not fully adequate to the specific conjecture of post-war situations
where decisions are made between what is possible or less unscrupulous.
According to Jarstad and Sisk, it is possible to subcategorize into 4 groups the
dilemmas that may arise when the processes of democratization and peacebuilding oppose each other.26 Peace-building may involve restrictions on
democratic freedoms such as freedom of the press and mass demonstrations. In
the long run, such constraints may cause turbulence and not only have an
adverse influence on democratization, but also turn into an obstacle for
implementation of the peace agreement. As civil war negotiations succeed,
obstacles of democratization arise as state representatives or rebel forces faces
uncertainty on how to protect their vital interests in the future through
democratic processes – particularly but not exclusively elections.

INT’L SEC. 5, 5–38 (Summer 1995); See JACK SNYDER, FROM VOTING TO VIOLENCE:
DEMOCRATIZATION AND NATIONALIST CONFLICT 27–31 (W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2000).
24. See generally Bumba Mukherjee, Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to
Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, But Not Others?, 50 INT’L Q. 479, 479–504
(Jun. 2006).
25. Wantchekon, supra note 8.
26. Jarstad & Sisk, Introduction, supra note 23, at 10–11.
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Table 1: Central dilemmas of democratization and peace-building suggested by
Jarstad and Sisk
Dilemma

Trade-off

Description

Horizontal

Inclusion vs.
exclusion

Relation between the elites of warring
parties and democratic political parties.
Difficult choice on who is participant in the
processes.

Vertical

Efficacy vs.
legitimacy

Relation between the elite and mass
politics. Difficult choice on the legitimacy
of actors and the efficacy of achieving
peace and democracy.

Systemic

Local vs.
international
ownership

Relation between the national and
international expertise and resources.
Democratization as well as peace-building
needs to be driven by local motives and
actors and not imposed or led by outsiders.

Temporal

Short-term vs.
long-term

Relation between short-term and long-term
initiatives. Efforts to support
democratization may in the short-term
increase the risk of violence, and thereby in
the long-term undermine the chances for
democracy to take root.

No examples were found where only one dilemma is in place at a time.
Therefore, the analysis and understanding entail an interacting helical
cogwheel perspective: one dilemma leads to one or more additional dilemmas
even more critical of a complex conundrum. As an example, institutions
building simultaneously involve temporal, vertical, and systemic dilemmas.
The transition war-to democratic peace requires hard choices. Some are related
to “when, where, who, and why” (moral dilemma of intervention), others to
“what, how, whose, which, how many, and how much” (dilemmas arising from
intervention). For example, too little military intervention or intervention that
comes too late, as the cases of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda has
demonstrated, is problematic. A promise of intervention not acted upon is even
worse, as in the African Great Lakes. Yet there is also such a thing as overintervention; the heavy-handedness of the UN intervention in Somalia
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hampered efforts to gain acceptance from the population and may have been
inefficacious.27
In this paper, my objective is to postulate that it is possible to further
contribute to the body of knowledge by advancing the analysis on the tradeoffs and paradoxes faced by democratization and peace-building by proposing
additional dilemmas to those proposed by Jarstad and Sisk.28
Table 2: Additional dilemmas of democratization and peace-building proposed
by the author (I. Pereira Watts)
Dilemma

Trade-off

Security

Lost certainty
vs.
Win uncertainty

Description
To struggle for power or negotiate
for freedom? Perhaps this is the
most central dilemma: war
certainty vs. peace uncertainties. As
per popular proverbs, “a bird in the
hand is worth two in the bush” or
“a living dog is better than a deal
lion” or “better one bird in the hand
than ten in the wood.”
Contrariwise, in war situations, it
might not be better to have a lesser
but certain advantage than the
possibility of a greater one that may
come to nothing. It is related to the
perceived or feared losses such as
of existence, property, prestige,
position, and security.
I argue that success in civil war
termination concerned with ending
the violence and establishing the
political space for enduring peace
requires a balance of carrots and
sticks.
To be part of the democratic game
and maybe win versus to stay in
war and maybe lose. By nature,

27. See Christina G. Badescu, Authorizing Humanitarian Intervention: Hard Choices in
Saving Strangers, 40 CANADIAN J. OF POL. SCI. 51, 67 (2007); Mohamed Sahnoun, Mixed
Intervention in Somalia and the Great Lakes: Culture, Neutrality, and the Military, in HARD
CHOICES: MORAL DILEMMAS IN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 87, 95–98 (Jonathan Moore ed.,
1998).
28. Jarstad & Sisk, Introduction, supra note 23, at 10–11.
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enemies cannot trust that the other
side will uphold an agreement in
democratic governance after a
winner-take-all election, and would
make the loser-side vulnerable and
therefore not willing to
compromise to the peace
agreement. There is an existential
connotation. There is a fear that a
rival will become stronger after an
election and will monopolize the
state power and weaken or target
those who lose elections. Linked
with the “certainty dilemma”, if the
results were certain, elections
would be unnecessary. The element
of uncertainty makes adversaries
willing to play by the rules of the
democratic game even if they
might lose, as they also might win.
But it is precisely the uncertainty
that might lead to violence. Powersharing increases the likelihood that
adversaries will remain committed
to the peace on a win-win situation
instead of a winner-takes-all
system.
Anything that is ethically related to
“right and wrong”. Is it right to do
it? A decision can be right and end
up having devastating
consequences.
Hazards of legalism and moralism
have often inflamed discussion of
governance, and their analyses are
rooted directly within
contemporary human struggles for
peace and justice. These include
predicaments of jus in bellum, jus
ad bellum, and most of all it is
concerned with jus post bellum.
It concerns dichotomies as to
follow the rules versus to maximize
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the good or minimize the bad.
Nature of duty and obligation
(deontology) vs. prioritizing on the
outcomes of the decision
(consequentialist). Ethical
dilemmas relating to humanitarian
intervention are hard choices
because they are both unavoidable
and complex. They are unavoidable
inasmuch as there are no readymade recipes to test the morality of
any given aspect of international
relations. Some examples: 1)
Intervention and aggravate war vs.
non-intervention and allow
genocide, 2) sovereignty vs.
responsibility to protect, 3)
consistency vs. coherence
(selective intervention vs. nonintervention) 4) Be impartial vs.
taking sides. 5) Approve sanctions
to enforce international law vs.
minimizing peoples suffer in
conflict. 6) Personal interests vs.
humanitarian assistance, 7)
institutional image vs. investigation
and consequences 8) Strategic
logistical humanitarian alliance
with military perpetrators vs. loss
of credibility with victims, 9)
effective personal humanitarian
work vs. keep the salary contract
for a longer term.
To go versus not to go to the polls.
There is a connotation related to the
protection of the citizen against
violence when exercising its civil
rights. Elections (pre-election,
during, and post-elections phases)
can be very violent and the
population may be threatened or
intimidated to go or to boycott the
polls or even pressured to
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overthrow the election results.
Voters face a mix of feelings such
as fears, uncertainty, and
expectations in the future. Very
often the available literature does
not distinguish between security
and safety and overstates them as
one single dilemma.
What comes first? For example: To
start the democratization process
from the national level (with
national elections) versus from the
local/district level (local elections).
Another alternative believes that
democratization is a hybrid process
where bottom-up and up-down
dynamics should be simultaneous.
Technical expertise can be
undermined by political choices of
a predominant warlord. The choice
of electoral system is one of the
most important political decisions
of a new country. Decision on the
democratic rules of the game must
be made between majoritarian or
proportional systems and on the
responsible authority to run it
through independent or political
Commission. Favoring a system
may result on favoring a political
axis, and therefore jeopardizing the
credibility and legitimacy of the
elections. Encouraging
ethnic/religious/political
polarization is undemocratic and
can endanger the peace process
with a return to violence.
Truth for illegitimacy for a lie for
stability?
A choice must be made between
truth and conflict versus untruth
and stability. Transparency is also
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related to peace agreement
negotiation, which are usually
made inside closed doors and by a
“petit comitée”. Too much
transparency can ruin the peace
process. But too little can
undermine democracy. Example:
The media can play two roles. It
can be democratic or a toll of
warlords (media coup d’état) when
brain-washing voters through
information and clarification or
through intimidation and fear or
even through money by paying for
their support. As part of the
transition, “media reform” is
usually part of the agenda on
democratization but is against the
interests of the warlords as includes
law on freedom of expression,
human rights advocacy, formation
of independent media, and training.
‘‘Peace media’’ promotes a more
effective and “democratic” media
after war with the interruption of
dissemination of “hate media”.
Democracy and money have
different timeframes: the first is a
long-term process. The later ideally
looks for short-term results. In the
aftermath of war, the country is
devastated and no state financial or
fiscal institution is in place to
manage the remaining natural
resources or to collect tax from the
survivors. International funds to
implement peacekeeping mission
are size restricted and time-limited.
The dilemma is how to implement
state structure without money.
Different from the systemic
dilemma related to ownership,
financial-fiscal dilemma is
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operational and related to the actual
production or management of state
revenue: either borrow and create a
public debt and dependency or to
do only what is manageable with
the available resources until the
creation of a proper tax collection
system.
The preambles toward democracy
usually revert to autocracy or to
anocracy in countries that have
very low incomes and literacy
and/or are oil-based economies.
Should they use the natural
resources left now to reconstruct
infrastructure and a nation or
should it be kept for the future and
have nothing now? Resources also
include capable human resources,
who normally are taken over by
international “experts”. Very often,
the use of national resources is
filled by corruption schemes due to
the lack of transparency on the
mechanisms of decision-making
and execution. Additionally, the
lack of basic infra-structure, leads
to a logistical dilemma that
impedes the democratization
processes of elections and justice.

Issues like corruption and gender permeate all of the dilemmas. By
advancing the body of knowledge and to better visualize as well as to make
room for deeper analysis, Graph 1 summarizes a new proposal of an
interrelated set of dilemmas that are faced when trying to build peace and
democracy in the aftermath of war in fragile states. I believe that awareness of
the existence of those challenges is already a step towards a better approach on
conflict resolution and more effective and durable transition to democratic
peace.
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Graph 1: New advanced set of dilemmas of democratization and peacebuilding

III. ELECTIONS: FROM THE BATTLEFIELD OF WAR TO BATTLEFIELD OF THE
BALLOT BOX

In war-to-democracy transitions, elections are a pivotal issue and are
widely seen as an integral part of the process of war termination, international
(dis)engagement, and nation building. The electoral process is a mechanism for
generating internal legitimacy for peace agreements. The establishment or
reinstatement of political order by some form of legitimate authority is utmost
in any transition from conflict to peace.29
After war, elections are not just a lottery or a coin flipping operation
towards peace. The electoral processes require critical choices over the
sequencing of elections, the electoral system formula, the nature of elections
(e.g., to a legislature, constituent assembly, or both), and other critical electionrelated issues such as application of citizenship laws and even the redesign of
electoral zones within the devastated territory. By searching for ideal
conditions under which to contribute to both goals, wrong choices on the
electoral processes may promote democratization but undermine peace, or
prioritize peace-building but fail in democratization. Contemporary peace

29. Reilly, supra note 19.
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agreements include post-war elections as means of conflict management.
Nonetheless, it often becomes a source of increasing tension and renewed
violence due to a combination of factors such as: lack of coordination
problems, information asymmetries, reinforcing of societal divisions, as well
as a mix of voters’ feelings of fears, uncertainty, and expectations for the
future. Moreover, a profound ‘‘safety dilemma’’ affects both voters and
candidates, whereby competing ethnic, religious, and political actors cements a
polarization of society. For instance, spoilers may use violence to disrupt the
transition process or to overthrow the election result as their power is
threatened by democratic elections. Other actors may use violence as a tool, by
preventing some actors from participating in the election campaign or by
intimidating people from going to the polls, as coercive methods to interfere on
the polls and the election outcome.
Naively, elections, as well as peacekeeping missions, are expected to be a
cure for all: “terminating civil wars; the transformation of warring armies into
peaceful political parties; stimulation of the development of ‘‘normal’’ politics;
choosing members of a legislature or other kind of representative assembly;
forming a government; and conferring legitimacy upon the new political
order,” consolidation of democracy, abolition of corruption and creation of
opportunities for economic reconstruction.30 Elections represent the crowning
event of the post-war peace-building phase, enabling the reestablishment of
legitimate domestic authority, and allowing international forces to disengage
and, in most cases, depart. On the contrary, post-war elections have often
fomented these tensions, particularly if it threatens elites when the expansion
of popular participation precedes the formation of and consolidation of
political parties. So, polls can represent a danger to peaceful state building. The
preambles toward democracy usually revert to autocracy or to anocracy in
countries that have very low income and literacy levels, weak state institutions,
deep ethnic divisions, or oil-based economies with no strong institutional
antidotes in place.31
When and how can elections advance stability in peace processes or
exacerbate conflicts? As mentioned by Kumar, “most war-torn societies lack
the political climate, social and economic stability, institutional infrastructure,

30. Reilly, supra note 19, at 157–58.
31. Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, When ballots bring on bullets; Democratic
deceptions II, INT’L HERALD TRIB. (Oct. 29, 2005); See Virginia Page Fortna, Peacekeeping and
democratization, in FROM WAR TO DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS OF PEACE-BUILDING, 39, 63 (Anna
K. Jarstad & Timonthy D. Sisk eds. 2008); The Role of Elections in Peace Processes: When and
How they Advance Stability or Exacerbate Conflicts, UNSSC (2011), available at www.unssc.
org.
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and even political will to mount successful elections.”32 Under what
circumstances can elections help in building a new, peaceful, democratic order
and under what circumstances can they undermine prospects for stable
democracy and pave the way for a return to conflict? In post-conflict
situations, several questions arise: When to hold elections? How the electoral
system should be? Who can vote and be voted? What are the procedures? Who
designs and decides the process? Those questions can be translated through the
following trade-offs: competitive elections versus conflict management; shortversus long-term electoral objectives; efficiency versus inclusion in terms of
government structure; sequenced versus simultaneous local, regional, and
national-level elections; party-based versus independent forms of electoral
administration; and the need to build local accountability versus development
of national party politics, together with finance, moral, and transparency
dilemmas.
Success in relation to war termination does not necessarily mark
‘‘success’’ relative to democratization. Liberia embodies this impasse: the
1997 flawed elections created more problems than they solved. But in 2005,
following the country’s second civil war, elections marked the end of the
transition and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf came to power as Africa’s first
democratically elected female head of state. In October 2015, Ivoirians went
peacefully to the polls, after the bloodiest elections in 2010 that left 3000 dead.
Post-war elections in Namibia in 1989, El Salvador in 1994, or Mozambique in
1994 played a vital role in making a decisive path towards peace. Delaying
elections can also prove fundamental in order to develop political structures
and enable the legitimization of the results as on the cases of East Timor and
Kosovo.
By contrast, elections in Afghanistan and Iraq have not led to an end to
hostilities and, inversely, have intensified the continuing conflict. Furthermore,
technical success may not be sufficient. In 1993, United Nations administered
polls in Cambodia and despite the technical success, the ‘‘losing’’ party
returned to power as a “winner” via coercive maneuvers.33 Angola (1992) and
Sierra Leone (1996 with the first multi-party election held in the country since
1977), led to a resumption of warfare as a result, in part, of the threats these
elections represented to incumbent elites. Similarly, attempts to foster peace
and stability in Rwanda by promoting political liberalization, prospection of
elections and ethnic power sharing ultimately backfired, in the worst possible
way, leading to the 1993 genocide. In Bosnia, post-war elections cemented in

32. Krishna Kumar, Postconflict Elections and International Assistance, in POSTCONFLICT
ELECTIONS, DEMOCRATIZATION & INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE 5, 7 (Krishna Kumar ed.,
1998).
33. MICHAEL W. DOYLE & NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE:
UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS 222–23 (2006); Reilly, supra note 19, at 158.
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power essentially nondemocratic elites and who had been leaders in the prior
conflict. In Ethiopia (1994 and 2000) and Uganda (2006 and 2011; note
Yoweri Museveni has been in power since 1986), elections were subverted to a
toll to legitimize the victory of the winning parties to the conflict.
Elections can also be a façade for a so called “warlord democracy.”34
Sudan is a quintessential case. Following the Second Sudanese Civil War
(1983–2005) and the war in Darfur, Sudan is widely recognized as an
authoritarian state where all effective political power is obtained by President
Omar al-Bashir and the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). In 1989,
Colonel Omar al-Bashir led a bloodless military coup. In 1993, al-Bashir
appointed himself “President” and took both executive and legislative powers
of the Revolutionary Command Council. Sudan became a single-party state
with a new parliament and government obtained solely by members of the
NCP. In the 1996 general election, by law, al-Bashir was the only candidate.
Despite his international arrest warrant, al-Bashir was a candidate in the 2010
Sudanese presidential election, with multiple political parties participating for
the first time in twenty-four years. Al-Bashir was declared the winner of the
election with 68% of the vote. International Crisis Group reported that the
ruling party had gerrymandered electoral districts.35 That means it used
political electoral tactics in the process of setting electoral districts to establish
a political advantage by manipulating district boundaries to create partisan
advantaged districts. Intimidation was reported from voters and the main
opposition candidate, Yasir Arman (SPLM), withdrew from the race days
before the poll. Additionally, the electoral vote tabulation process was reported
by the Carter Center as “highly chaotic, non-transparent, and vulnerable to
electoral manipulation.”36
Although elections are not synonym of democracy, it is a condicio sine qua
non of the political system and therefore faces specific dilemmas on the
transition from war-to-peace. In this same vein of analysis, elections in Uganda
represent the dilemma between peace and democracy: the system puts an end
to political violence and unites and stabilizes the country but does not promote
a so-called “liberal democracy.”37

34. See generally Wantchekon, supra note 8, at 24, 31.
35. Rigged Elections in Darfur and the Consequences of a Probable NCP Victory in Sudan,
INT’L CRISIS GRP. (Mar. 30, 2010), http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/
sudan/b072-rigged-elections-in-darfur-and-the-consequences-of-a-probable-ncp-victory-insudan.aspx.
36. Carter Center Reports Widespread Irregularities in Sudan’s Vote Tabulation and
Strongly Urges Steps to Increase Transparency, THE CARTER CTR. (May 10, 2010),
http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/sudan-051010.html.
37. Reilly, supra note 19.
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a) Temporal, financial, resources, and safety dilemmas as exit strategy:
When and how to hold elections?
Should elections be held early even with the risk that extremists may
legitimately win power or should they be postponed until the society is less
polarized?38 Elections are held often within a year or two of the start of a UN
mission or of a cease-fire, as it requires a minimum level of security and a
basic level of infrastructure in place. This is followed by a rapid hand-over to
the newly elected local authorities, and an even exit-strategy for a more rapid
departure of international troops and personnel. ‘‘Premature elections’’ can be
counter-productive: in general, the early application of elections immediately
following a conflict increases the likelihood that the contest will become a de
facto contest between the former warring armies masquerading as political
parties. A classic case of “instant elections’’ is that of the November 1996
election in Bosnia. Besides the pressure to start the development of a national
political process, the stress was largely provoked by the Clinton administration
in order to show progress in the Balkans in time for mid-term elections in the
United States. By contrast, an extended process of consultations and local-level
peace-building may offer better prospects for a peaceful transition in post-war
societies. The real interests and concerns that provoked the conflict should be
addressed in a step-by-step fashion before national elections are held. East
Timor and Kosovo had delayed elections and stated from municipal pools,
allowing a gradual step towards democratization.
Authors like Roland Paris defend the postponement of elections, often for
a two-year period.39 They claim that before holding elections, priority should
be given to the development of moderate political parties and of a judicial
mechanism to regulate disputes on electoral-related issues in order to establish
conditions for holding free and fair elections. However, by postponing,
opportunities to support the closure of war may be left behind irreversibly.40
Without solid institutional ground, the process of democratization is halted or
overturned by threats and intimidation from actors seeking to disrupt the
transition, overthrow the election results, or prevent election campaigns or
voters from going to the polls. If so, that also alerts the “safety dilemma”.
Besides deciding when – how early or how late – to put in place the ballot
box, another temporal-sequential dilemma arises: should the start of authority
legitimization be bottom-up or up-down? If national elections are held before

38. Kristine Hoglund, Violence in war-to-democracy transitions, in FROM WAR TO
DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS OF PEACE-BUILDING, 80, 91 (Anna K. Jarstad & Timonthy D. Sisk
eds., 2008).
39. PARIS, supra note 19, at 190.
40. See Mimmi Soderberg Kovacs, When Rebels Change Their Stripes: Armed Insurgents in
Post-War Politics, in FROM WAR TO DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS OF PEACE-BUILDING 134, 138
(Anna K. Jarstad & Timonthy D. Sisk eds., 2008).
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local ones it facilitates the introduction of civic education routine of electoral
politics and party politics in new democracies. Furthermore, national elections
generate incentives for the formation of central, rather than regional, political
parties as well as a formal national authority to deal with the international
actor.41 However, to first-test through municipal or local elections before
national seems more suitable for the transitional elections towards a bottom-up
democracy building perspective. Nevertheless, for the development of a strong
and integrated political party system, national, regional, and local elections
should be run simultaneously.42 Additionally, it is more financially viable as it
uses the same logistical efforts. That also leads to a “financial dilemma”: if
democracy is a long-term process, international funds to implement
peacekeeping mission are limited and work against the clock. That explains
why elections are usually held as early as possible in peace keeping operations.
Due to financial pressures, many missions have an incentive to withdraw their
presence as soon as there are some home-grown institutions, such as
representative legislatures and multiethnic peace and security forces that create
both the shell of a state and a legitimate political body for the international
community to deal with. Here, financial, resources, safety, and temporal
dilemmas go hand-in-hand.
Graph 2: Electoral temporal dilemma: hard choices between doing good for
peacekeeping or for democratization
Elections
Early elections:

Late elections:

Good for peacebuilding

Good for democracy

- UN can leave and go to
another place

- Political parties created and consolidated
-Civic education

- Set up a legitimate political
body for the international
community to deal with.

-Logistics
-Probability of acceptance of results
-Political will

-Uncertainy of warring groups
may lead to more violence

-Infrastructure
-Civic education
- Management of national resources

41. JUAN J. LINZ & ALFRED STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION AND
CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE
100,100, 101 (1996).
42. Larry Jay Diamond, Toward Democratic Consolidation, 5 J. OF DEMOCRACY 4, 8–9
(1994).
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b) Systemic and design dilemmas: Defining the results before the
elections
In the aftermath of conflict, domestic political institutions are weak or nonexistent, voters are suspicious, and elites’ hold on power is feeble. Under this
environment, how should the electoral system be in post-conflict? First,
elections can be strategically and calculatingly designed to encourage not zerosum, winner-take-all outcomes, but rather the sharing of power between
groups. In most of the cases, election results are decided before the election by
defining the rules of the game; that represents a peril of making a façade for
the return to old patriarchal system or warlords.
Secondly, the objectives of the referenda are different when related to
independence or self-determination from a phased or gradual series of
consultations. Therefore, the goal will determine the rules of the game that
refer to the “design dilemma”: usually choices are among plurality-majority,
semi-proportional, and proportional representation (PR) systems. Amid
plurality systems are first-past-the-post, runoff, block, and alternative vote
systems. By contrast, proportional representation systems characteristically use
larger, multi-member districts and deliver more proportional outcomes and
include ‘‘open’’ and ‘‘closed’’ versions of party list PR, as well as ‘‘mixedmember’’ and ‘‘single transferable vote’’ systems. Over the past decade, many
new democracies opt for the semi-proportional systems such as the single nontransferable vote as it offers “hybrid” approaches: mixtures of plurality and
proportional models by which part of the parliament is elected via PR and part
from local districts. In this vein, UN-administered elections seem to largely
prefer the Party-list PR as it has been frequently used as in the cases of
Mozambique (1994), Liberia (1997), Bosnia (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002), Kosovo
(2001), Sierra Leone (2002), Rwanda (2003), and Iraq (2005). The main reason
for national PR systems is logistical, taking into consideration that a) a uniform
national ballot can be used, b) same electoral districts can be used, and c) most
of all, the different phases of the process (voter registration, vote counting, and
the calculation of results) are simplified compared to other methods.
Obviously, the choice of electoral system is one of the most important
political decisions for any country and will also influence others aspects of the
political system such as the development of the party system, linkages between
citizens and their leaders, political accountability, representation, and
responsiveness by electoral choices in a context where there is probably no
new constitution or electoral law set yet. Favoring such a system may result in
favoring a political party/candidate, and therefore jeopardizing the credibility
of the elections. Some systems can also have the effect of fragmenting the
legislature and marginalizing minority groups. Encouraging ethnic polarization
amongst the electorate is undemocratic and can lead to animosities and,
therefore, endanger the peace process. Illustrating this, the 2005 Afghan
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parliamentary elections featured over 5,800 candidates – in Kabul alone the
ballot paper displayed over 400 names – resulting in a fractionalized and
incoherent parliament that is likely to remain highly divided and unable to
coordinate around pressing policy challenges. The choice for Single nontransferable vote (SNTV) advantaged smaller parties. Competition within the
party brings to the surface personal characteristics that make the development
of a party system in the short term improbable.
Thirdly, according to Adam Przeworski, democracy is a political
arrangement that processes but never definitely resolves social conflicts.43
Under this premise, “a functioning democracy serves as a system of conflict
management, with potential conflicts channeled into constitutional arenas, such
as non-violent competition between political parties, rather than armed conflict
on the streets.”44 These arguments are reinforced by empirical studies that
emphasize the success of consolidated democracies in accommodating social
cleavages and tensions through peaceful means.45 Reilly explains that
democracy pleas for this “certainty of uncertainty” to provoke trustworthiness
from all players and to be sustainable on the long term.46 The “certainty
dilemma” is what makes adversaries willing to play by the rules of the
democratic game even if they might lose. Through mechanisms that distribute
state power among former armed adversaries in a manner that prevents any
group from becoming dominant, as no single entity will use the power of the
state in a way that promotes its interests while threatening the security of
others on a “winner takes all” election model. In this perspective, powersharing increases the likelihood that adversaries will remain committed to the
peace. But then again, in post-war societies, the uncertainty of election results
is in itself a source of violence, and a major threat to incumbent elites that can
make them wary of committing to the game at all. It is related to the fear that,
“(1) a rival is likely to become stronger following an election that places its
hands on the levers of state power; and (2) the rival may then use that authority
to weaken or otherwise target those who lose elections.”47 There are several
models of election administration that can mainly be grouped as independent
or party-based.
Who has the role and responsibilities to organize the elections? Another
impasse is related to the role and responsibilities in charge of the bodies
running the elections. This intensifies two dilemmas: structural and systemic.

43. ADAM PRZEWORSKI, DEMOCRACY AND THE MARKET: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
REFORMS IN EASTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 10–11 (Jon Elster & Michael S. McPherson
eds., 1991).
44. Reilly, supra note 19, at 165.
45. Hegre et al., supra note 14, at 34.
46. Reilly, supra note 19, at 165.
47. Hartzell & Hoodie, supra note 7, at 47.
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Besides the large literature on democracy and electoral reforms, electoral
administration in post-war remains understudied. There are different choices to
allocate responsibility of administration of elections that are usually: 1)
creation of independent, non-partisan and specific body; 2) within a
government portfolio, like the ministry of interior affairs; 3) within
government agencies, such as the public records office, the tax department, or
even the postal service; 4) creation of a new body before each electoral event
(ad hoc); and, 5) under the United Nations (as in Cambodia in 1993 or East
Timor in 2001). The first three alternatives are under the umbrella of the
structure along with the electoral system choice. However, very often, there is
no infrastructure, technical expertise or even legitimacy to be run by national
actors. If internationally run the elections take place, there might be technical
success and credibility, but also a lack of local ownership and a creation of a
dependency relationship with outsiders, which is non-desirable at the
embryonic phase of the democratic era.
c) Vertical and horizontal dilemmas: Democracy to whom?
Who can play the democratic game? The democratic system implies
inclusion and equality. However, in post-conflict scenarios, including
“everyone” might be unfair as well as a path towards the return to war. The
inclusion of internally displaced peoples, refugees, and ex-combatants in the
electoral process is a recurring dilemma in post-war elections.48 Can the
victims or perpetrators vote and be voted? Consider the refugees, people who
left the territory to be safe overseas. With a massive out-flow of refugees as in
Syria, the Congo, and Rwanda, if they cannot vote due to being abroad, it
might result in an exclusion of a great proportion of the population. The “Syria
migration crisis” is a contemporary example. The exclusion of part of the main
victims, an estimated in four million refugees in December 2015, can be unfair
and also undemocratic.49 Those who have stayed might support the
perpetrators to power that is out of benefit of only a few.
Predictably, the situation immediately after the elections is particularly
sensitive. It is of particular security concern if contenders will resort to
violence unless they emerge as winners. Changing uniforms from a repressive
regime or from a rebel group to political party suits does not automatically
result in an increase in legitimacy. There is a potential concern in relation to
security sector reform. If the same people that have committed atrocities
become part of the new police force and government, legitimacy of the new

48. See Brett Lacy, Building Accountability, Legitimacy, and Peace: Refugees, Internally
Displaced Persons, and the Right to Political Participation, INT’L FOUND. FOR ELECTORAL SYS.
(2004).
49. See U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Global Humanitarian
Overview 2016 (2016), https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/GHO-2016.pdf.
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institutions may be demoralized. However, the recruitment of former rebels is
needed to fill a security vacuum as well as to occupy former soldiers who are
potential threats to peace if left unemployed.
d) Transparency, moral, and vertical dilemmas: (un) peaceful, (un)free, &
(un)fair media
Once again, the dynamic in post conflict is very different from “normal”
political conjectures. For competitive free and fair elections, fundamental
political rights are required such as freedoms of movement and of speech.
However, militant political organizations might misuse these rights. In
particular, the competitive nature of elections may aggravate existing conflicts
and societal cleavages. Political mobilization is likely to be along the conflict
lines where differences rather than similarities are brought to the surface
through revenge speeches. The electoral process is filled with military
metaphors and fighting rhetoric such as: ‘campaigns’, employing ‘strategies
and tactics’ approach to “win” votes, “cadre” as faithful Party, and
‘strongholds’ or ‘citadels’ referred to areas with many supporters.50 Threat,
intimidation, and violence are used to influence the electoral process. As
explained from the safety dilemma, voters usually fear of being killed if the
warlord does not win the elections. There is hope as well as disillusion on what
the so-called “democracy” could result in.
The vertical dilemma is very explicit in relation to free and transparent
media. For the sake of legitimacy, involvement of the people in all phases of
the peace and democratization processes is desirable. But for the sake of
efficacy, certain negotiations need to be held behind literal closed-doors, and
often secretly. Freedom of expression and press freedom are generally
considered cornerstones of a democratic society and are also formulated as a
fundamental human right in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.51 Nonetheless, in the course of armed conflict, media commonly
becomes polarized and serves as a tool for propaganda to the conflict parties to
foster hatred – often times with ethnic overtures –and to rapidly mobilize
people for violence. The media can be a powerful tool and in the most extreme
cases has played a crucial part in genocidal violence, as in Rwanda, Bosnia,
and Kosovo. During conflict, the media becomes an extra party and in
democratic times, it becomes a hidden fourth power after the executive,
legislative, and judiciary as it directly influences the masses. In countries
emerging from war, not only is there a lack of human resources trained on

50. David C. Rapoport & Leonard Weinberg, Elections and Violence, in THE DEMOCRATIC
EXPERIENCE AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE 15, 31 (David C. Rapoport & Leonard Weinberg eds.,
2012).
51. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), Art. 19 (Dec. 10, 1948).
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journalism and capable on media resources, but also the system apparatus is
owned by elites or warlords and the editors-in-chief are appointed by a single
party.
Additionally, to the legal parameters, ownership, transparency, capacity,
infrastructure, and funding, accessibility is another struggle. With an average
of 80% of the territory infrastructure destroyed and in poverty,52 the radio
might be more suitable then television and newspaper where more technology
and investment are needed. The genocide in Rwanda was mostly disseminated
through the radio. Furthermore, apparently simple questions such as “which
language should be used in the elections?” can be another example of battle.
As a result of minorities having their voice excluded, lack of transparency,
domination of one ethnic group over another, as well as favoritism, they
become vulnerable and responsive to emotive tactics used in elections
campaigns such as hatred speech and other measures employed to inflame
constituents with the aim of producing a non-result. Timor-Leste is an example
of a “tower of Babel”: with two official languages in the constitution, two
other “working languages” during the transitional time, together with other 31
local languages, the dissemination of new laws or even the establishment of an
educational curriculum adds complexity to the already chaotic post-war
transition. Similarities are found in places like Afghanistan, Georgia, and
Guinea-Bissau.
Moreover, the democratic values of the media are to be independent, nonpartisan, and laicist and its principles are to be impartial, accurate, and active.
Therefore, in order to defend freedom of speech (without defamation),
individual rights, free initiative, human rights, republican values, science
innovation, and environmental protection it cannot be in favor of or against
governments, religion, clubs, economic groups, or political parties. Crucial to
democratic accountability, a functioning and diverse media should provide
information to the citizens and critical scrutiny of political issues.
New media like Internet and social media have created new waves of
impact on democratization as the role of Facebook during the Arab spring and
the organization of many political movements in Ukraine, Thailand, Hong
Kong, and around the world demonstrate. The so-called “netocracy”, a
symbiosis of Internet and democracy, shows its colossal power to influence
millions of people in seconds. Some governments, like China and Russia,
recognize this power and control the access to the Internet and social media
within its territory. “Voter-generated-content”, such as videos on YouTube
have been identified as a drift towards “videocracy’”. As examples, the
election of Silvio Berlusconi as Italy’s Prime Minister in 1994 was seen by

52. See Paul Collier, On the Economic Consequences of Civil War, 51 OXFORD ECON.
PAPERS 168 (1999).
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many as a “media coup d’état” as well as overthrow of Nicolae Ceauşescu in
1989 in the “first revolution on live television” in Romania.
Therefore, as part of the transition, “media reform” is usually part of the
agenda on democratization with a “media advisor officer” under the political or
civil affairs department of the UN mission. It usually consists of efforts to
create new laws guaranteeing freedom of expression as well as to restructure
the media infrastructure including the formation of independent media and
widening the range of media outlets and ownership.53 Training in what has
been termed ‘‘peace media’’ has been gaining ground in peace-building
efforts. Among so many “priorities” to build peace, democracy, and socioeconomic development, the “media reform” seems secondary and slow. The
promotion of ‘‘codes of conduct’’ and licensing systems,54 and the interruption
of the transmission or dissemination of hate media appears to be techniques to
promote a more effective and “democratic” media after war. Therefore, besides
the vertical and temporal trade-offs, costs and ownership of the media reform
also alerts the systemic and financial dilemmas. Of course, it is easy to identify
that the moral dilemma permeates all those previous dilemmas of transparency
and anti-corruption measures as well as fairness and freedom of the process
and of the actors are prerequisites.
Democratization goes beyond the dilemmas surrounding elections. Human
development is unlikely to progress in “anarchy” as they work best within
well-functioning states. Contrariwise, failing and failed states are personalized
by rulers that did not distinguish public from private realms and have become
“kleptocracies,” (governments of thieves). The “rulers” are indeed predators
and neither make nor enforce law. A new constitution must mirror the new
reality to be able to enforce peace and the rule of law. Constitutionalism can be
decisive to power-sharing but also faces several dilemmas concerning the
choice of peace or democracy.
IV. CONSTITUTIONALISM: DEMOCRACY & RULE OF LAW FOR WHOM?
On one hand, according to Aristotle, man without law is the lowest of
animals. On the other hand, as a Haitian saying goes, “Constitution is paper, a
bayonet is iron.”55 Lawlessness is what characterizes the state of belligerence
in war-torn countries. Either on a Hobbesian or Lockean approach, the main
priority is to establish a political order, as democracy cannot bourgeon in the

53. Hoglund, supra note 38, at 87.
54. PARIS, supra note 19, at 198.
55. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 29 (John Berseth ed., 3rd ed. 2000) (Benjamin Jowett trans.,
1885); Julia Leininger, Democracy and UN Peace-Keeping – Conflict Resolution through StateBuilding and Democracy Promotion in Haiti, in 10 Mack Plank Yearbook of United Nations Law
465 (Armin Von Bogdandy & Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2006).
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absence of natural rights or in a state of anarchy.56 After war, a new country
must be built. It requires new rules that reflect the new reality. It is a new
social contract between the political-warring groups themselves and between
the political-warring groups and the populaces.
After war, a new constitution is usually written “for the People” and set in
place to be obeyed “by the People”. One problem is “from which People” the
constitution will be written and how the Constitutional Assembly will be
established and legitimate. These problems have already been mentioned in the
electoral section of this paper. As pondered by Falk et al., the constitutional
foundations of “world peace” require logic and tinkering.57 Worldwide
constitutional framework can be highly significant, both analytically and
politically, in efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace. Pitfalls of legalism and
moralism have often afflicted discussion of governance, and their analyses are
rooted directly within contemporary human struggles for peace, justice,
prosperity, and environmentally sustainable societies. To make
constitutionalism work, it must be well-designed to block tyrannies and
protecting core rights of citizens from potential violations. Additionally, it
must foresee public accountability mechanisms for officeholders by calling for
rule-governed and transparent procedures during a time-limited mandate as
well as dividing public authority among multiple offices and institutions.
Power’s monopolization opposes power-sharing. Although it is common to
delegate some power to maintain the monopoly, to delegate is not synonymous
with sharing. Monopolies of power are found in tyrannies, despotisms, military
autocracies, monarchies, theocracies, or one-party dictatorships. Democracy
may also cohabitate with monopolistic domination if power of a ruling class or
elite lies behind the façade of electoral competition for power.
Is power sharing through constitutionalism the key for peace and
democracy in the aftermath of conflict? To begin with, albeit potentially
intersecting notions, it is important to differentiate four different concepts:
power-sharing from power division as well as separation of power and
competition for power.58 Although it is important to highlight those
distinctions, it is fundamental to keep in mind that: when emphasizing the
distribution of authority among former rivals, it is generally very difficult to
establish certain attributes in states emerging from civil war that would be
“normal” in “peaceful scenarios”. The first concept relates to structures of
divided societies to govern jointly within specific organs or institutions.

56. Wantchekon, supra note 8, at 23.
57. See generally, THE CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD PEACE (Richard A. Falk
et al. eds.,1993).
58. See generally, PHILIP G. ROEDER & DONALD ROTHCHILD, SUSTAINABLE PEACE:
POWER AND DEMOCRACY AFTER CIVIL WARS 6 (2005); Stefan Wolff, Conflict Resolution
Between Power Sharing and Power Dividing, or Beyond? 5 POL. STUD. REV. 377, 381 (2007).
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Power-sharing suggests both coordinated and jointly shares of decision making
and autonomy in group or territory. Power-sharers search for sharing power
across national, ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups through their
representatives making joint decisions in executives, legislatures, and
judiciaries branches. Power-sharing is more than acknowledging that “what
cannot be won on the battlefield is best allocated through a shared forum and a
shared executive.”59 Power-sharers do not seek a social contract among a
unified people as Rousseau’s proposal. It suggests a minimal civility among
divided communities on “consociational form” or among territorial
governments on a “federalism form”.
Secondly, power division suggests a separation of power among the
governmental organs of the common-state that can create more conflict,
polarized society, and state within state structure. Power division implies that
through division the parties receive shares that are individualized as communal
politics. Civil liberties and multiple majorities are said to be central to power
dividing. In practice, it results in an allocation of power between government
and civil society such that the “most important issues that divide ethnic groups,
but must be decided by a government common to all ethnic groups.”60 Thirdly,
separation of power refers to the Montesquieu’s idea to avoid centralization of
power and to forestall tyranny by a monarch or oligarchy. It is highly accepted
to divide the state into at least three main branches with specific mandate that
cannot be overlapped by another branch: legislative, executive, and judiciary.
Separation does not advocate a coordinated policymaking system and is not
organized to facilitate group organization. Separation of powers between the
branches of government and a range of specialized agencies dealing with
specific, and clearly delimited policy areas are to create multiple and changing
majorities. Thus members of ethnic minorities can be parts of political
majorities on some issues and members of any ethnic majority will be
members of political minorities on other issues. As a mechanism of checks and
balances, policy and order are expected to emerge from the clash of ambitious
power-holders scattered across multiple institutions.
Fourthly, elections are the democratic regulated tactic in the competition
for power. The competition for power is a sine qua non of democratic
government: a political system enshrined in a constitution in which officials
compete for authoritative positions for limited terms in free and fair elections
for citizens’ votes; hold office within constitutional norms that ensure
accountability both through the ballot box and recourse to the courts. Elections
for executive and legislative posts continue to be an alternative of preventing
59. Brendan O’Leary, Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places: An Advocate’s
Introduction, in POWER SHARING IN DEEPLY DIVIDED PLACES 1, 14 (Joanne McEvoy & Brendan
O’Leary eds., 2013).
60. Wolff, supra note 58, at 380.
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nefarious monopoly. Conversely, judicial and administrative positions are
often meritocratic promotion with transparent and reviewable procedures.
O’Flynn and Russell affirm that among the new challenges for divided
societies is to recognize that power share incorporated in “constitutional
designs adopted at times of crisis are means to survival.”61 Constitutionalism
can be the key to peaceful power-sharing as it is normally established in such
foundational documents. Nonetheless, it does not mean that all constitutions
are power-sharing systems. The abuse of political power is constitutionally
possible. For example, the constitution may assign the authority to the
plenitude of the executive power to a person, faction, or party, for a limited
time. Emergency powers to a domination executive representation (faction,
party, or national, religious, or ethnic group) might include provision of “war
powers” for the suspension of basic rights and fundamental freedoms. Or it can
be undemocratic in divided societies if the constitution excludes the plurality
of beliefs, traditions and social relations by establishing the basis of eligibility
for citizenship based on just one religion, one language, one ethnicity, or even
gender. In the case of Myanmar, the 2010 Constitutional Reform towards a
“discipline-flourishing democracy” was strategically planned by the military
junta to prohibit Aung San Suu Kyi to run as president of the country. Or it
may powerfully entrench some identities at the expense of others. A president
or prime minister with such power may promote legislation that reflects only
the preferences of the dominant nationality, race, religion, or linguistic group,
and control the judiciary and administration with strategic appointees. Courts
staffed and controlled by the same party of the executive may not act as
guardians of individuals’ rights or of collective minorities. If so, the so-called
“rule of law”, an important characteristic of the democratic system and of
sustainable peace, it rapidly becomes repeatedly the rule of the dominant
majority or faction in power, and, therefore, a return to the “rule of the gun”.
By neglecting the separation of power, the balance of power loses its
equilibrium. Worst, and very debatable, is the change in constitution that
eliminates the principle of alternation of power. By allowing the head of State
and/or Government to be re-elected ad aeternum, the basic democratic
principle of alternation of power is undermined, and consequently undercuts
the power sharing arrangements leading to authoritarianism and warlords in
power. Uganda, as well as cases of non-civil wars but pseudo-democracies of
the “Bolivarian Axis” (Cuba-Venezuela-Bolivia-Ecuador) are examples of the
latter. Thus, the principle of periodic elections may become redundant if there
is no political space for opposition and free and fair elections.
In the aftermath of conflict, constitutionalism simultaneously faces four
dilemmas: temporal (when), systemic (national ownership), horizontal (mass
61. Donald L. Horowitz, Foreword, in POWER SHARING: NEW CHALLENGES FOR DIVIDED
SOCIETIES vii, ix (Ian O’Flynn & David Russell eds., 2005).
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representation), and vertical (political plurality). For McEvoy and O’Leary,
“Constitutionalism per se does not prevent cultural homogeneity from
becoming the hallmarks of policy and the state.”62 During war times, the
constitution has been put on fire as a chunk of “useless” paper that no longer
serve to the people. After war, the struggle is how to implement and enforce
the new set of rules of the social contract. Formally or informally,
constitutionalism is necessary to build democracy and long-term sustainable
peace. However, in divided societies and in the aftermath of conflict,
constitutionalism can be an illusion for successful power-sharing, rule of law,
and protection of individual’s human rights.
Last but not least, modern power-sharing is conceived by some of its
enthusiasts as a necessary supplement to constitutionalism. Moreover, some
scholars would suggest that that is the only option for democratic governance
in the shadows of war.63 Power-sharing helps to establish what is crucial in the
aftermath of civil war: a political order and collaboration between warring
factions and elites. By inference, power-sharing would contribute to peace as
well as democracy. However, as there is no fantasy way out of the legacy of
war, power-sharing can be, in the long-term, a source of instability, ineffective
governance by incompetent government, and violent conflict, and therefore,
jeopardizes both processes of democratization and peace-building. On one
side, inclusion of warring groups in government can facilitate peace as
everyone can mutually rule through its share. On the other side, reserved seats
for warring parties may undermine democratic legitimacy of silencing mass
votes. Thus, if the peace agreement it is not well designed, power-sharing can
stimulate violence. While an extensive amount of literature on democratization
and checks and balances exists, power-sharing specific to post-conflict
situation remains limited by Political Sciences and related disciplines of
Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies.64 According to Pippa Norris, powersharing institutions work.65 States with institutions that are consistent with
power-sharing tend to perform better in terms of democracy. Power-sharing is
an “anti-democratic mechanism” as it removes the influence of the masses as it
previously distributes power among selected actors and rewards violence by
granting warring parties positions.66 As mentioned by Hartzell and Hoddie,
62. O’Leary, supra note 59, at 10.
63. See Paulina Pospieszna & Gerald Schneider, The Illusion of ‘Peace Through PowerSharing’: Constitutional Choice in the Shadow of Civil War, 15 CIVIL WARS 44, 47 (2013).
64. See Hartzell & Hoddie, supra note 7, at 37; see also Anna K. Jarstad, Power Sharing:
Former Enemies in Joint Government, in FROM WAR TO DEMOCRACY: DILEMMAS OF PEACEBUILDING 105, 108 (Anna K. Jarstad & Timonthy D. Sisk eds., 2008).
65. See PIPPA NORRIS, DRIVING DEMOCRACY: DO POWER-SHARING INSTITUTIONS WORK?
223 (2008).
66. Hartzell & Hoddie, supra note 7, at 52 (citing Terry L. Karl, Dilemmas of
Democratization in Latin America, 23 COMPARATIVE POLITICS 1, 11–12 (1990)).
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“power-sharing itself is not inherently democratic.”67 But in a minimalist form
of democracy, it represents the art of the possible. Due to the paper’s size
restriction for publication, power sharing systems in the aftermath of conflict
will be analyzed in another article.
The democratic crusade promotes war and death.68 The difficulties that
post–civil war conditions pose for a transition to democracy are usually
underestimated. Therefore, (re)installation of democracy via war is a great
contradiction. “Should the UN be in the business of ensuring democracy at the
barrel of a gun?”69 In the transition from war to peace, how are the United
Nations peace-building missions are involved democracy building? The UN’s
role in promoting democracy often struggles between balancing ideals and
reality.70
V. INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION: OWNERSHIP OF THE PEACE-BUILDING AND
DEMOCRACY BUILDING PROCESSES

A variety of studies have demonstrated that United Nations peace
operations significantly facilitate, and might even be a prerequisite for, lasting
peace after civil wars.71 Nonetheless, the UN faces the problem of building
democracy in war-torn societies in ways that are fundamentally
undemocratic.72 Therefore, the dynamic and the dilemmas between peace
interventions and democratization in post-conflict countries require further
exploration to avoid the recurrence of the conflict and the vulnerability of
fragile states. One of the main literature lacunas is that many studies limit their
analysis to quantitative data in the short period of two or five years from the
peace agreement signature to the conclusion of the peace operations.73 Peacebuilding, democracy-building, state-building, and most of all, nation-building,
suggest an extensive and complex process that is analogous as to a roller
coaster. Therefore, with a coarse process filled with ups and downs, the
efficiency or efficacy of the procedure and the different agents cannot be
assessed as “snapshots.”74

67. Hartzell & Hoddie, supra note 7, at 49.
68. ERROL A. HENDERSON, DEMOCRACY AND WAR: THE END OF AN ILLUSION? 94–95
(2002).
69. See Jarstad & Sisk, Introduction, supra note 23, at 6.
70. See UNITED NATIONS, THE UN ROLE IN PROMOTING DEMOCRACY: BETWEEN IDEALS
AND REALITY (Edward Newman & Roland Rich, eds., 2004).
71. See Fortna, supra note 31.
72. SIMON CHESTERMAN, YOU, THE PEOPLE: THE UNITED NATIONS, TRANSITIONAL
ADMINISTRATION, AND STATE-BUILDING, 205–06 (2004).
73. See generally DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK? supra note 3; Kim, supra note 4, at 114.
74. See DOYLE & SAMBANIS, supra note 33, at 336; Barbara F. Walter, Does Conflict Beget
Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War, 41 J. OF PEACE RES. 371, 372.
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United Nations understands that democratization includes: 1) support for
constitutional and legal reforms, 2) the establishment of election
administration, 3) training of election staff and media professionals, 4) political
party assistance, 5) human rights monitoring and 6) civil society aid. All
interventions and decisions related to ownership, empowerment as well as
transparency are predominantly challenged by the principles of sovereignty
and responsibility to protect (R2P). Regarding the dilemmas explained in
section 1, international intervention experiments trade-offs are mainly related
to moral, systemic, financial and temporal dilemmas. The triangular relation
between war, democracy, and UN is surrounded by impasses, like sovereignty,
ownership, and empowerment, as well as transparency.
First, is the moral dilemma of intervention that points out the trade-off
between sovereignty and responsibility to protect? From a broad theoretic
viewpoint, interventions are international policies that from time to time
violate international norms, occasionally support the incessant oppression of
people, and sometimes bring armed violence to an end and perhaps they may
pave the way towards peace and stability. Where the literature falls short is in
explaining satisfactorily whether “sometimes” is “often”, or when facilitating
peaceful settlements is more probable.75 Civil wars have turned out more and
more frequently to be international events, as the case of Syria patently
presents. Legality and legitimacy are the main oxymoron of international
intervention in civil wars by the United Nations. In the perspective that war
intervention is a continuation of politics by order, means that peacekeeping
continues to be a complex element resulting in selective and collective
humanitarian international intervention in intrastate wars. “Fixing” fragile
states and solving civil war through peacekeeping permeates above and beyond
the sovereignty quandaries.
What makes a state a state is called sovereignty. So, what happens in the
cases of failed states? On the one hand, Westphalians argue that failed states
are “failed” precisely because they cannot enforce the sovereignty in their
territory. If no sovereignty exists, therefore, international intervention is
justified, as there is no empty space in politics as an extension of physics
axioms. It is not an “intervention” per se, but an “occupation of misused or
(un)used space,” and therefore, is legal and legitimate. Sovereignty, territory
and borders cannot be dissociated in international law, specifically when
referring to wars, whether internal or external.76 The perception of borders, as
passive lines on a map, reveals integral forces in the economic, social,
political, and environmental processes. Borders undoubtedly remain hot topics
75. Patrick M. Regan, Interventions into Civil Wars: A Retrospective Survey with
Prospective Ideas, 12 CIVIL WARS 456, 456 (2010).
76. See generally THE STATE OF SOVEREIGNTY: TERRITORIES, LAWS, POPULATIONS
(Douglas Howland & Luise White eds., 2008).
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across the social sciences and in the global headlines as underscoring the
impact they have on a range of issues, such as economic development, interand intra-state conflict, global terrorism, migration, nationalism, international
law, environmental sustainability, and natural resource management. The
customary rule of the use, ownership and control of the territory has
historically been the motive of wars or interventions. Territoriality also serves
to the constructivist means of national identity by defying who “we” are and
who “they” are. Determining who the actors are is crucial to conflict
resolution.
On the other hand, Post-Westphalians argue that failed states are “failed”
because international assistance did not help with operations of state-building
or nation-building as a responsibility and duty to protect. Ungoverned spaces
open alternatives to state authority in an era of softened sovereignty.77
According to Francis Deng, a vulnerable or failing state should invite
international assistance precisely as a way to protect its state sovereignty and
show its will towards good governance.78 Failed democracy in failed states
opens controversial debates regarding fairness, selectiveness, and preventive
collective intervention.
According to non-interventionists any interference in the affairs of the
sovereign state in the name of humanitarianism directly breaches the UN
Charter restrictionist article 2(7): “nothing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.”79 As questioned by Franck: who
killed this article?80 In fact, realists argue that this could lead to abuse, because
since interveners only pursue their national interests, they may use issues
regarding human rights as a pretext for intervention in order to achieve their
political objectives. Ian Brownlie, a leading restrictionist argues that
humanitarian intervention, on the basis of all available definitions, would be an
instrument wide open to abuse, “a rule allowing humanitarian intervention …
is a general license to vigilantes and opportunists to resort to hegemonial
intervention.”81 There is no doubt that the problem of abuse could damage the
already fragile issue of legality and legitimacy, however, this does not mean

77. See UNGOVERNED SPACES: ALTERNATIVES TO STATE AUTHORITY IN AN ERA OF
SOFTENED SOVEREIGNTY (Anne L. Clunan & Harold A. Trikunas eds. 2010).
78. Francis M. Deng, From ‘Sovereignty as Responsibility’ to the ‘Responsibility to Protect’,
2 GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 353, 354 (2010).
79. Rudi Guraziu, Is humanitarian military intervention in the affairs of another state ever
justified? 4 (January 2008) (unpublished thesis, Middlesex University) (on file with the author).
80. See Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or: Changing Norms Governing the
Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT’L L. 809 (1970).
81. Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 139, 147–48 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973).
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that force should not be used when governments massacre their own citizens.
“Sovereignty cannot be used as a pretext of governments as a license to kill.”82
Besides legality, humanitarian crisis responses are driven by international
politics of selectivity. What is of interest concerns the extent and the nature of
selective interventionism. The problem of selectivity with respect to
humanitarian standards and human rights principles arises from the fact that
these rights, as embodied in various documents including the United Nations
(UN) Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide
Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and the two International Covenants on
Human Rights, are universally valid and, in some respects, even compelling
(the principle of jus cogens) are often not applied in a consistent or ethical
way. Consequently, double standards still predominate when the international
community faces the dilemma whether or not to intervene. The arrangements
of selectivity are not only empirically puzzling, but they also imply conflicting
theoretical expectations with regard to the international response to
humanitarian crises and the extent of the so-called “selectivity gap.” In
essence, constructivist and cosmopolitan accounts emphasize the strengthening
of “humanitarian” norms and identities. Therefore, there is a growing
frequency of humanitarian action even in situations where no economic or
geostrategic interests are in jeopardy. With the increasing significance of
human rights norms on the international agenda, this would lead one to expect
an increase in humanitarian activity as well as a high degree of consistency in
addressing those crises. Contrariwise, “since many humanitarian crises do not
affect vital interests, realist accounts would expect highly selective responses
in such situations.”83
The UN also faces predicaments regarding legitimacy, effectiveness,
transparency, and corruption, as well as partiality and non-neutrality. The
effectiveness of peacekeeping on democratization remains open to debate. A
neutral UN peacekeeping mission can assist in the transition to democracy.
Yet, a powerful external enforcer can end up being a substitute and part of the
conflict for that embryonic democracy in fragile states.
Second, international involvement may be necessary to end violence and to
facilitate negotiations. But, democratization as well as peace-building needs to
be driven by local motives and actions. The issue of ownership of local versus
international control of the processes of democratization and peace-building is
related to the systemic dilemma. The citizens of the countries that receive
support for democratization and peace-building must feel that they own the
processes, and that democracy is not imposed from the outside. The United
Nations has to assume a more authoritative role or even transitional
82. Guraziu, supra note 79, at 4.
83. Martin Binder, Humanitarian Crises and the International Politics of Selectivity, 10
HUM. RTS. REV. 327, 328 (2009).
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administration in cases where either the local authorities fail to prevent crimes
against humanity and mass violence (e.g., Sierra Leone, Timor Leste), or when
the state itself was the perpetrator of atrocities (e.g., in Cambodia and Kosovo).
Therefore, a difficult challenge must be faced by the international actors: to
perform firm control to manage conflict, provide security, and organize
elections, or to engage with “good offices” in order to empower local actors for
them to conduct the necessary procedures towards a functioning state? For
Simon Chesterman, the United Nations, faces the problem of building
democracy in war-torn societies in ways that are fundamentally undemocratic
to start with – the undermining of the state sovereignty over the responsibility
to protect.84
Third, the United Nations is often under financial pressure to manage a
transition quickly in order to move resources on to the next crisis, as from
Liberia to Sudan.85 The new multidimensional missions have included the
democratic reconstruction model of peace-building and place a robust
emphasis on the use of elections in post-conflict operations. By analyzing the
commitment of parties to elections, their timing and their mechanics, UN peace
operations present elections as a possible democratizing tool. That means a
way of legitimizing international intervention, the formation of new
governments as well as that of war termination. When the United Nations
peace operations are involved in elections, are they building peace and
democracy or organizing an exit?86 As previously elucidated, premature
elections have become common for several reasons: the need to ‘‘do
something’’ quickly, to start the process of political development and, of
course, to have an identifiable ‘‘exit strategy’’ for international involvement.
Peacekeeping missions do not last forever. Financial pressures force many
missions to downsize as soon as it is minimally feasible to do so. But,
according to Shaw, elections are no longer used as an exit strategy and the shift
has facilitated the implementation of the democratic reconstruction model.
However, even in the most conducive post-conflict situations, it remains
extremely difficult to successfully facilitate democratic transitions in war-torn
territories. As in the cases of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia
(UNTAC) and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET),
elections have shifted from being the central component of UN mission to
being used as one aspect of a wider democratizing project. Cases such as these
lend some weight to the World Bank’s suggestion that elections in war-torn

84. See CHESTERMAN, supra note 72, at 257.
85. Jarstad & Sisk, Introduction, supra note 23, at 10.
86. See generally STUART SHAW, BUILDING PEACE AND DEMOCRACY OR ORGANIZING
EXIT: ELECTIONS AND UNITED NATIONS PEACE OPERATIONS (AV Akademikerverlag ed., 2012).
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societies should be deferred by up to a decade to allow state building to
occur.87
Action can do harm. But inaction can also do worse. If the international
community does something, either as humanitarian intervention to protect
sovereignty or to protect the individual, the a priori conclusion is frequently:
“It is too late!” Although, when it comes to saving lives, it is never too late for
humanitarians. There is always a window of opportunity. Thus, a temporal
dilemma is central to UN intervention queries.
As consistently stated by Virginia Page Fortna: “Peacekeeping missions
are habitually under-funded, under-equipped, and understaffed… peacekeeping
can help establish peace, which is good for democracy, but it also undermines
the establishment of that democracy.”88 Very often, they are decided at the last
minute, with unrealistically short mandates and excessively ambitious
timelines and benchmarks. The task of turning countries into stable,
functioning, democratic states where political institutions, economic
infrastructure, and the very fabric of society have all been devastated by civil
war, is hectic and undermines sovereignty.
VI. CONCLUSION
As introduced, at the end of a civil war, there is indeed no democracy just
yet. There is a mist of hope and disillusionment about how democracy can
bring peace and stability. There are not yet any pillars of an ideal western form
of democracy as Robert Dahl’s concept of polyarchy suggests, with political
and civil liberties such as freedom of expression, freedom of the press, the
freedom to form groups, citizen participation, and the responsiveness of
government. Democracy requires peace and stability, but war and its pressures
on the state can provide incentives for democratization.
Civil wars are one of the critical issues of our time: they represent
contemporary challenges not only to state stability and legitimacy, but also to
regional and global order. From war to peace, how can democracy prevail over
anarchy? Without naivety, post-civil war democracy is essentially procedural
and minimalist. In this paper, I argue that on a status quo of belligerence,
lawlessness, and distrust, the goal is to create political order first, and
democratic liberties later. It is Hobbesian in its origin due to the nature of
anarchy. At least in the period immediately following negotiations, the most
probable version of democracy in post-war is the one the elites believe best
minimizes threats to their existence, which includes the threat of the restoration
of armed engagement. In the transition from war-to-peace, democracy might

87. See PAUL COLLIER ET AL., BREAKING THE CONFLICT TRAP: CIVIL WAR AND
DEVELOPMENT POLICY, 185–86 (2003).
88. Fortna, supra note 31, at 39.
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prevail on a minimalist or Schumpeterian plane: it would be able to fit nascent
democratic institutions to the specific conditions of a traumatized society on a
collapsed state to contain such political-ethical-ideological tension within
peaceful bounds. In the aftermath of civil war, democracy emphasizes
leadership, and the elections, rather than appointment, of former warlords as
political office holders. It simultaneously arbitrates conflicts between former
warring factions and protects citizens’ properties against illegal expropriation
and violence. Post-civil war democracy is also Popperian in its form because it
is aimed at avoiding the return to civil war and anarchy by preventing
tyrannical rule through elections. A political system is not democratic because
the majority rules, but because the institutions are designed to prevent the rise
of a totalitarian government that can a priori be dismissed through popular
accountability instead of violent revolution. Even if democracy does not
appropriately aggregate citizens’ preferences or adequately control politicians
or help reduce economic inequalities, the very fact that it might help change
governments without bloodshed can help generate a peaceful resolution of
conflicts. This form of democracy is defensible because, better a minimalist
form of democracy than maintenance of the belligerent and lawlessness status
quo.
The end of war is the start of a long process of multi-phased procedures
towards democracy and peace. In order to make the transition to democracy,
post-war conflict represents a struggle of dilemmas and trade-offs. This paper
shines the spotlight on central dilemmas originated from the efforts of building
peace and democracy in fragile states after war. In line with the finding of
Jarstad and Sisk, and other authors and contributors, the horizontal, vertical,
systemic, and temporal dilemma were analyzed.89 In this paper, I contribute
theoretically to the body of knowledge by advancing the paradoxes faced by
democratization and peace-building with additional 8 dilemmas: security,
safety, moral, sequencing, design, transparency, financial, and resources. In the
second and third part, elections and constitutionalism were analyzed according
to this set of dilemmas as sine qua non principles of democracy and the rule of
law. A more realistic and less ideological appraisal of elections is still required.
Success is dependent on a careful consideration of timing, sequencing, design,
and resource issues. As part of a post-war peace deal, elections cannot be
postponed for more than a few years. However, instant elections can be a
dangerous toll to legitimize extremist parties without a proper development of
a political party system. Independent electoral commissions are preferable as
well as the sequence’s bottom-up approach, from local to national elections.
Finally, as a responsibility to protect, democratization and peace-building are

89. See Sisk, Peace-building as Democratization Findings and Recommendations, supra
note 15.
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promoted by international actors who also face impasses, like sovereignty,
ownership, and empowerment, as well as transparency.
The existing literature fails, as it tends to analyze democracy and peace
principles as if they were the same in a post-civil war environment. The
difficulties of post-civil war conditions should not be underestimated. New
democratic regimes usually lack the resources or institutional means to make
and guarantee the kind of accommodations that typify the consolidated
democracies. There is no readily available formula, but the purpose is to avoid
or mitigate some of the dilemmas that may arise on the transition from war to
peace. Which model of democracy should be adopted, must be established on a
case-by-case basis. Delegative, representative, or participatory democracies are
ideal options, but not yet possible in these post-war societies. Due to size
restrictions for this paper’s publication, and for a robust understanding, it is
recommended that further analysis of the same set of dilemmas regarding
justice, human rights, civil society, and the process of disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration of warring groups be conducted. In this
paper, I argue that in war-torn societies’ transition, the model of democracy
that might prevail in the aftermath of conflict is a minimalist form if political
will, some infrastructural level, and an appropriate political climate are in
place. Social and economic stability, institutional infrastructure, countercorruption measures, and impartial judiciary will come as a consequence after
the reduction of ethnic divisions and an organized civil society has emerged.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

390

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXV:351

